Yanis Varoufakis and Stuart Holland have come out with a new version of their “Modest Proposal” for resolving the euro crisis (an earlier version of the Proposal appeared as a Levy Institute policy note in 2011). The latest iteration (4.0) adds a new co-author in James Galbraith and an additional “sub-crisis” to the original three: the eurozone, they say, faces a banking crisis, a public debt crisis, a crisis of under-investment, and now, after five years of policy failure (due in part to treating the situation as only a debt crisis) Europe faces a social crisis.

The “modesty” of the authors’ policy approach hinges on avoiding what they describe as a false choice between “draconian austerity and a federal Europe.” They argue that we can make substantial progress on addressing these multiple crises without resorting to things like national guarantees, fiscal transfers, or treaty changes. For instance, here is the outline of their proposal for dealing with sovereign debt:

The Maastricht Treaty permits each European member-state to issue sovereign debt up to 60% of GDP. Since the crisis of 2008, most Eurozone member-states have exceeded this limit. We propose that the ECB offer member-states the opportunity of a debt conversion for their Maastricht Compliant Debt (MCD), while the national shares of the converted debt would continue to be serviced separately by each member-state.

The ECB, faithful to the non-monetisation constraint (a) above, would not seek to buy or guarantee sovereign MCD debt directly or indirectly. Instead it would act as a go-between, mediating between investors and member-states. In effect, the ECB would orchestrate a conversion servicing loan for the MCD, for the purposes of redeeming those bonds upon maturity.

Dimitri Papadimitriou, Gennaro Zezza, and Michalis Nikiforos have put together a stock-flow consistent model for Greece in order to analyze the path of that nation’s struggling economy and assess alternatives to reigning austerity policies. This is a macroeconomic model based on the New Cambridge approach of Wynne Godley and is the same sort of model used for the Levy Institute’s US strategic analysis series.

One thing the results of their simulations make clear is that the European Commission (EC) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been consistently too optimistic about the Greek economy and the effects of continuing with austerity policies — and still are, even after the IMF’s admission that it had overestimated the benefits of fiscal contraction. Here, for instance, are the EC’s past and current projections for Greek unemployment, compared to the actual results and the Levy Institute’s projections through 2016.

As you’ll notice, the baseline projection generated by the Levy Institute model for Greece (LIMG) shows a rather more dire path for unemployment going forward, compared to the EC’s latest projections. If current policies continue, the unemployment rate could rise from its ruinous 27.4 percent to almost 34 percent by the end of 2016.

The troika’s (EC/IMF/ECB) “internal devaluation” strategy — based on the idea that forcing a reduction in wages will increase competitiveness and boost export-led growth — isn’t faring well. Cutting wages by government fiat has contributed to a drop in domestic consumption. And as you can see below, while there was an increase in Greek exports that accompanied the onset of fiscal contraction, exports have not risen by nearly enough to compensate for the decrease in the other components of aggregate demand (from their trough, exports grew by almost 8 billion euros; over the same period, government expenditure alone fell by 13 billion euros).

The authors acknowledge that it’s possible exports could grow further, but it’s unlikely that the increase in net exports will be sufficient to make up for plummeting investment, consumption, and government expenditure (and the latest data show that Greek exports were actually declining in the last quarter of 2012). “The implication of our findings,” they conclude, “is that achieving growth in exports through internal devaluation will take a very long time, and furthermore, declining fortunes of the country’s major trading partners do not bode well for [Greece’s] exports.”

The troika’s continued devotion to faulty intellectual doctrines creates serious contradictions in terms of its deficit targets for Greece and its attendant expectations for growth and employment. This new stock-flow model for the Greek economy makes that all the more evident: the authors show that a fiscal stimulus worth around 41 billion euros would be necessary for Greece to reach the troika’s GDP target for the middle of 2016. That would require Greece’s deficit to rise to 12 percent of GDP. Needless to say, that amount — or any amount — of fiscal stimulus isn’t in the troika’s plans.

Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza call for a “Marshall plan” for Greece: an investment, funded by the European Investment Bank (EIB), in an expanded public service job creation program — a program that has had impressive results in other countries and, on a smaller scale, in Greece itself.

The strategic analysis for Greece (download an early look at the full report here) is accompanied by a technical report that explains the specification of the model and discusses in more detail how the data were used.

Segment (in Greek) begins at 49:35.

In this Skai TV interview, Dimitri Papadimitriou focuses on the eurozone banking crisis and rising unemployment in the southern tier, arguing that the approval of 200 million euros to combat unemployment in Greece is far too small to reach the desired outcome.  (Segment, in Greek, begins at 23:30)

The French and German governments recently issued a joint statement titled “Together for a stronger Europe of Stability and Growth.” The communiqué emphasizes strengthened policy coordination and the use of indicators in establishing a common assessment of economic conditions in the currency union as a whole, member states, and particular markets. The new push for deeper policy coordination is intended to prevent future crises by identifying early on any incipient imbalances that might point toward fresh troubles ahead. Overall, the initiative aims at making the European economy more resilient and competitive.

Such an exercise begs the question of what should be the benchmark and underlying model in the envisioned common assessment. In this regard, Germany has sharpened its diplomatic skill-set, and is keen to have France on its side at the launching platform. For at some point the benchmark will need to be spelled out. While today’s German authorities may not wish to say so all too loudly, it is clear that they view Germany as the model to follow for its crisis-stricken euro partners. So it was left to Angela Merkel’s predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, to be a little more suggestive in a recent op-ed in The Financial Times titled “France should copy Germany’s reforms to thrive.” Referring to the experiences with Germany’s Agenda 2010 reforms of 2003-5, which apparently took a few years beyond Mr. Schröder’s chancellorship to bear fruit, the former German chancellor closes charmingly with the words: “I am confident that our friends in Paris will act accordingly.”

For it is France in particular who has come under immense pressure of late to finally do the right thing to get its ailing economy back on track. The right thing being to do the German thing of course: to embark on allegedly growth-friendly fiscal consolidation together with supposedly growth-boosting structural reform. Legend has it that this strategy restored Germany’s competitiveness and provided the foundation for the country’s miraculous resurrection from the depressing status as the “sick man of the euro” only so very few years ago. But is Germany really the model of excellence or perfection when it comes to the optimal economic management of the eurozone economy? continue reading…

Who is running the largest current account surplus in the world? China? Saudi Arabia? Both wrong! These are only the number two and three countries. China had a record $420bn surplus in 2008, but that imbalance has more than halved since. As a share of GDP China’s external imbalance is down from ten to two-and-a-half percent since the global crisis — evidence of a remarkable rebalancing. The oil price would need to be significantly higher still to make Saudi Arabia the number one.

So for 2012 the number one prize actually goes to: Germany! The world champion of 2012 ran up a current account surplus of almost $240bn. At a rocking seven percent of GDP, that’s just slightly below Germany’s pre-crisis record of almost $250bn in U.S. dollar terms. In euro terms 2012 actually set a new record for Germany. And that is an interesting part of the whole story, as the euro has depreciated by some 20 percent from its peak against the U.S. dollar.

Back in the 2000s, the euro appreciated very strongly against the U.S. dollar (as well as in real effective terms) between 2002 and the summer of 2008. Euro appreciation cut Germany off from benefiting even more from the record global boom of the 2000s. However, somehow Germany, then also known as the “sick man of the euro,” managed to run up gigantic regional current account surpluses, both vis-à-vis its euro partners and vis-à-vis the larger European Union (of 27 member states). At its pre-global crisis peak Europe was the primary source of Germany’s current account surpluses. Don’t miss then what a remarkable re-loading and re-sourcing of German external surpluses has occurred since then. continue reading…

Last week, James Galbraith was supposed to be interviewed by ERT, the public broadcaster in Greece.  Events intervened when the Greek government ordered that ERT be shut down, and so instead of sitting for the interview, Galbraith delivered this speech in Thessaloniki in front of a large gathering assembled in response to the closure (ERT defied the directive and continued broadcasting on the internet; yesterday, a Greek court ordered that ERT be put temporarily back on the air).  After noting that the Greek crisis has been going on for five years now, with no sign of progress, Galbraith suggested that it might be time to start reconsidering the policy approach:  “After a certain amount of time, even an economist ought to reconsider their ideas. Most other people would so much more quickly, but we are a very patient and stubborn profession.”

In the context of the IMF’s latest release in its mea culpa series, this time on the problems with the Greek bailout plan (pdf), Dimitri Papadimitriou appeared on Skai TV to discuss the worsening crisis in Greece, the failure of austerity, and the need to renegotiate the bailout deal.  Segment (in Greek) begins at 9:35 mark:

The formation of the eurozone represents “the wildest experiment in financial history,” according to C. J. Polychroniou:

the eurozone was to involve the inclusion of independent states, with highly diverse economic systems and cultural settings, that were required to give up national currency sovereignty in exchange for a “foreign” currency without the backing of a treasury or a central bank ready to act as lender of last resort in the event of a financial crisis.

And with the eurozone mired in recession (the latest numbers from Eurostat are here) and a deep depression in Greece, it might look like a failed experiment.  But it only looks this way, Polychroniou suggests, if you think of economic growth and the wellbeing of the average worker as among the primary goals of the project.  The setup of the EMU is not the result of some set of technical errors or oversights.  It is consistent with a long-developing attempt, culminating in the Maastricht Treaty, at transforming a social market economy into a laissez-faire market economy:  “it stemmed,” Polychroniou writes, “from the very premises of the fundamentally neoliberal economic thinking that had begun to take hold of the mindset of European policymakers in the 1980s.”  If anything, he argues, the struggles in the eurozone, particularly on the periphery, are being seized on as an opportunity to accelerate this transformation, with Germany playing the role of “neocolonialist” in the process:

Germany has adopted toward the indebted eurozone member-states the same policy it carried out with regard to East Germany after unification: the destruction of its industrial base and the conversion of the former communist nation into a satellite of Berlin. The bank rescues masquerade as the rescue of nations, and are followed by the enforcement of unbearable austerity measures to ensure repayment of the “rescue” loans. Then comes the implementation of strategic economic policies aimed at reducing the standard of living for the working population and the shrinking of the welfare state, complete labor flexibility, and the sale of public assets, including state-controlled energy companies and ports. This constitutes the German strategy for pillaging the debt-laden economies of the Mediterranean region.

Read it here.

In economics, there is a remarkable “stickiness” in bad ideas and confusions. In fact, some bad ideas and confusions never seem to go away. For instance, last summer Martin Feldstein bravely suggested that euro weakening would help solve the euro crisis and rescue Europe (WSJ: “A weaker euro could rescue Europe”). Similarly, in a Bruegel Institute Policy Brief also published last summer and titled “Intra-euro rebalancing is inevitable but insufficient,” Zsolt Darvas argued that euro weakening was badly needed to restore competitiveness of euro crisis countries whose perceived inability to rebalance their external positions was a major root of the euro crisis. More recently, these two issues, euro external competitiveness and intra-euro competitiveness imbalances, were also bundled together in a piece by David Keohane titled “Why strength could be the single currency’s undoing” (FT.com 17 April 2013). Mr. Keohane seemed to identify a “euro paradox,” or even two paradoxes actually. One apparent paradox is that policy measures by the euro authorities that boost confidence in the euro run the risk of doing damage to it by undermining its long-term existence through enticing euro strength, which would postpone an export-led recovery. The other seeming paradox is that the single currency cannot exist at different levels for different countries and that it will therefore always be expensive for some and cheap for others.

Unfortunately, euro weakness as the supposed solution to the euro crisis is a thoroughly misguided piece of advice. The idea about the euro being expensive for some but cheap for others at its current level is nothing else but the external mirror image to the fact that competitiveness positions inside Europe’s currency union are utterly unbalanced – which led to corresponding intra-area current account imbalances and debt overhangs. While this is a correct diagnosis of intra-euro imbalances, implying a need for rebalancing, it must be stressed that there was absolutely nothing inevitable about this outcome. It was just that, contrary to the requirements of a currency union, Euroland simply failed to keep unit-labor cost trends within the union aligned with the commonly agreed two-percent inflation norm. In particular, as Germany stabilized its nominal unit labor cost trend at zero under the euro, the country turned űber-competitive in due course as a result. This resulted in the buildup of excessive current account surpluses – with corresponding German exposure to debts issued by its euro partner countries and exuberantly gobbled up by German banks and investors.

Perversely rewarded by the markets, Germany is imposing competitive austerity on its uncompetitive partners as the cure-all that is supposed to restore stability as well as growth. Quite predictably, the result of allegedly “growth-friendly” continent-wide austerity is catastrophic. Domestic demand in the eurozone has been shrinking for over a year now, at an annual rate of around 2 percent. The decline in GDP has been contained to less than one percent only due to a very sizable positive growth contribution from net exports. continue reading…