In his latest policy note, C. J. Polychroniou argues that the political and economic dominance of finance is pushing advanced liberal societies to a breaking point:

The main problem is the power that finance capitalism exerts over domestic society and the abuses that it inflicts. Finance capitalism is economically unproductive (it does not create true wealth), socially parasitic (it lives off the revenues produced by other sectors of the economy), and politically antidemocratic (it restricts the distribution of wealth, creates unparalleled inequality, and fights for exclusive privileges). At the turn of the 20th century, finance capitalism … was still seeking to bring industry under its control and exercised its brutal power largely on undemocratic societies overseas. By the late 1970s, it can safely be said that finance capitalism had subjugated industry at home and took control of government power in the same manner that the great industrialists of the 19th and 20th centuries were able to influence public policy. The difference is that finance capitalism has no vested interest in seeing the living standards of ordinary people improve, and regards any public intervention as an attack on its freedom to exploit society’s economic and financial resources as it sees fit. Industrial capitalism was a progressive stage of economic development relative to agrarian capitalism and feudalism. …. But the dominance of finance capitalism represents a setback for society as a whole.

Read the rest here.

Philip Pilkington and Warren Mosler have teamed up to present a financial innovation that they believe could settle the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis:  a special type of “tax-backed bond” that contains a clause stating that if (and only if) the country issuing the bond defaults, the bond can be used to make tax payments in that country.  “If an investor holds an Irish government bond, for example, worth 1,000 euros,” they write, “and the Irish government misses a payment of interest or principal, the investor can simply use the bond to make tax payments to the Irish government in the amount of 1,000 euros.”

Pilkington and Mosler call attention to the fact that countries like Japan that issue their own currency are not facing unbearably heavy interest costs on their debt; with the reason being that such countries can always make payments when due.  Investors know that Japan can always create enough yen to meet its obligations.  Eurozone member-states, however, are users, not issuers of the euro, and as a result, while many countries in the periphery have debt-to-GDP ratios that are smaller than Japan’s, they nevertheless face higher and higher debt servicing costs.

The idea behind the tax-backed bond, which draws inspiration from Modern Monetary Theory, is to provide a way of securing investor confidence in peripheral debt (the bonds are guaranteed to be “money good,” since they’re acceptable for the payment of taxes in the event of default) and thereby keep interest payments under control, without requiring a eurozone exit; to provide a way of endowing peripheral debt with an aura of safety comparable to that of the debt of a currency-issuing nation—but without requiring a country like Greece to actually leave the euro and revert to the drachma.

And as Pilkington and Mosler argue, if this plan works, the bonds would never actually be used for tax payments:  “since this tax backing would set an absolute floor below which the value of the asset could not fall, and because the bonds pay a fair rate of interest, there would be no risk of actual loss and no reason to part with them—and, hence, the bonds might never be used to repay taxes.”

You can read their proposal here.

The Nation notes that austerity policies in Europe have proved to be very damaging to economic growth in the region, and points out that after adhering to IMF and EU austerity programs since last May, Portugal is “even deeper in the hole. The austerity has only increased its debt, as it has spread more suffering.”

The editorial goes on to point out that the euro countries have also been hindered by their unified currency system. This system currently makes it difficult for member governments to see to it that there is a market for their bonds and other securities—namely, their central banks. Taking exception to Republican fears of a “Greek-type collapse,” the Nation emphasizes that the “sovereign currency” possessed by the American government has always allowed it to avoid difficulties making payments on its debt. (A web version of the editorial is here. A similar Washington Post opinion piece is posted here.) Compare this with the current financial problems experienced by many state and local governments, as documented by recent articles in the New York Times (“Deficits Push New York Cities and Counties to Desperation”) and the Wall Street Journal (“States Keep Axes Sharpened”).

Many things can go wrong in an economy, even one with a smoothly running monetary system.  But the Nation’s argument remains crucial for the U.S.—first, that deficit-financed stimulus programs have helped keep our economy going; and second, that a government with its own currency is almost unable to default.

Quick note: In an interesting op-ed piece, Martin Wolf of the Financial Times notes that U.S. budget deficits have allowed the  private sector to deleverage a bit: “If the public sector does not sustain spending as the private sector  cuts back, the latter will go too far, causing unnecessarily deep damage to the economy.” He contrasts the U.S. situation with the crisis in the United Kingdom and Spain, where deleveraging has not gone as far. He points out that Spain’s lack of a sovereign currency has prevented its government from helping along the private-sector deleveraging process.

C J Polychroniou explains how the latest pair of efforts aimed at addressing the Greek crisis, the newest bailout package and the bond swap, create tremendous complications down the road even if they may offer a temporary respite.  As you know, the bailout money was shackled to a series of grim austerity measures that will push the already struggling nation further under water.  But his analysis of the bond swap is even more intriguing.

One way of getting at the political challenge in the eurozone is to note that many powerful economic solutions involve, not to put too fine a point on it, reinvesting resources from countries like Germany into countries like Greece.  This is something that happens all the time within units that understand themselves as nations (or aspire to such an understanding.  As Dimitri Papadimitriou and Randall Wray point out, after reunification Germany invested resources in the former East Germany in much the same way).  But the question of whether revenues from New York are being shoveled into Mississippi rarely becomes a live issue.  Within the eurozone, however, these distributional questions are fraught with political peril; dooming a whole host of solid policy solutions.  And Polychroniou suggests that the restructuring of roughly 200 billion euros in private debt that just took place may have actually made these political dynamics worse (while also making life more difficult for Greece if forced out of the eurozone):

the bond swap was a deal forced on private investors, … yet the new bonds have been issued under foreign law. This doesn’t mean that the Parthenon is at risk of one day falling into the hands of foreign creditors, but it does mean that the Greek government has lost whatever strategic advantage it may have had in the ruthless game of sovereign debt restructuring. For one, all of Greece’s debt is now wholly owned by public institutions (with European taxpayers bearing much of the cost), so the next debt restructuring phase could entail political, not merely economic, consequences. Simply put, it could pave the way for Greece’s forced exit from the eurozone. Indeed, given the prevailing sentiments toward Greece across Europe, it is most unlikely that European taxpayers will accept kindly the idea of getting stuck with Greece’s bill while allowing a pariah state to remain in the Union. However, in the event of an exit from the eurozone, Greece will no longer be able to pass legislation to convert euro-dominated debt into new drachmas.

Read the whole thing here.

The title of C. J. Polychroniou’s latest policy note, “Neo-Hooverian Policies Threaten to Turn Europe into an Economic Wasteland,” gives you a pretty good idea of where he’s coming from:

There can be no denying that, despite the experiences provided by the Great Depression and the numerous financial crises that have taken place since 1973, policymakers have been dismally wrong in their assessment of the 2007–08 global crisis and governments dreadfully incompetent in developing a clear strategy for addressing it appropriately. The reason for this lies with an economic ideology, a conceptual framework with which government officials and bankers deal with economic reality, that is fundamentally flawed.

As a way of addressing some of the flaws of the eurozone policy architecture, and of counteracting the ideology of austerity that is embedded in that architecture (the “fiscal compact” currently being debated, which would place more automatic penalties on governments that deviate from severe limits on budget deficits, goes even further in embedding this ideology in the setup of the European Monetary Union), Polychroniou is looking to a “United States of Europe” model, with an expansion of EU-level fiscal policy powers.

As he observes, however, the European project is moving in the opposite direction:

Indeed, in an indication of where Europe may be headed politically, the EU’s budget was slashed by four billion euros in 2010, with some governments arguing that the EU budget, in the words of British Prime Minister David Cameron, should be progressively “reduced rather than increased”—and this appears to be the definite trend in Euroland.

What manner of union is this?

Read the policy note here.

C. J. Polychroniou surveys the distressing results, in terms of unemployment (and particularly youth unemployment), of the “neo-Hooverism” and obsession with price stability that permeate European Union policymaking and explains that a fundamental change in approach is needed:

Europe is in dire need of an economic and political revolution. It needs an immediate return to Keynesian measures and a new institutional architecture for the eurozone. It needs to move toward a United States of Europe. If such steps are not taken, Europe’s economies and societies could very well end up in a situation similar to that of the United States in the 1930s.

Read Polychroniou’s one-pager here.

Yanis Varoufakis, former adviser to the Greek Prime Miniser and co-author of “A Modest Proposal,” delivers this special report for Channel 4 News on the situation in Greece:

(credit to Naked Keynesianism)

A quick comparison of working hours for supposed Greek “grasshoppers” and German “ants,” or of the generousness of their governments’ respective social welfare expenditures, should help dispel the tiresome insect talk.

Update:  There is a good interview of Varoufakis posted today at Naked Capitalism that opens with a discussion of “the essence of the economists’ inherent error”: continue reading…

At the end of the last exchange, when Fragkiskos Filippaios asks, with respect to the idea of a common fiscal policy for Europe, “who’s going to be responsible for that?” you can hear Papadimitriou’s reply:  the European Parliament.  For more on his views about how to complete the incomplete Union in Europe, see Papadimitriou’s latest policy brief, “Fiddling in Euroland.”

The Financial Times got its hands on a confidential “debt sustainability analysis” that was circulated among eurozone finance ministers.  The gist of the analysis is that the austerity measures being imposed on the Greek population will depress growth so brutally that the government will almost certainly not meet its debt reduction targets:

…even under the most optimistic scenario, the austerity measures being imposed on Athens risk a recession so deep that Greece will not be able to climb out of the debt hole over the course of a new three-year, €170bn bail-out.

It warned that two of the new bail-out’s main principles might be self-defeating. Forcing austerity on Greece could cause debt levels to rise by severely weakening the economy while its €200bn debt restructuring could prevent Greece from ever returning to the financial markets by scaring off future private investors.

In other words, the latest rescue plan for Greece could be classified (if one were feeling deeply generous) under the category of “buying time.”  But buying time for what exactly?

In this policy brief, Dimitri Papadimitriou and Randall Wray tell us that the eurozone must ultimately move in one of two directions:  either toward a coordinated breakup or toward the development of some real fiscal and monetary policy capacities, which means having the European Central Bank step up as a buyer of last resort for member-state debt and increasing the fiscal space of the European Parliament so that it is able to stimulate growth.  The Union, in other words, must be severed or completed. continue reading…

If it controlled its own currency, the usual thing for a country like Greece to do in these circumstances would be to devalue.  Since it doesn’t control its own currency, Greece is being “asked” to pull off an internal devaluation, or as C. J. Polychroniou puts it:

Essentially, what they agreed to are additional measures that are specifically designed to reduce the standard of living for the majority of the working population as a means of improving the nation’s competitiveness. Aside from firing civil servants, the new memoranda are all about major private sector wage cuts and an overhaul of labor rights.

This is from Polychroniou’s newest one-pager, “The New European Economic Dogma,” released yesterday.  Polychroniou takes on what he regards as the flawed ideology behind the policies that are being dumped on the Greek people; policies motivated by an ambiguous and, says Polychroniou, toxic conception of “competitiveness.”

Read the one-pager here.