Update:  the transcripts were released this morning (Jan. 18) and are available here.

Any day now, the transcripts from the 2007 Federal Reserve Open Market Committee meetings will be released to the public (FOMC transcripts are withheld for five years).  These transcripts should give us some additional insight into the discussions that were occurring around the outbreak of the global financial crisis and help fill in our understanding of the reasoning behind the Fed’s initial response.  See here for the detailed breakdown of what we already know about the Fed’s “unconventional” lender-of-last-resort responses, including tallies of all the loans and asset purchases made under various special programs and facilities, and breakdowns of the support provided to major recipients.

The Federal Reserve operated with a large degree of discretion during the course of the crisis (under the auspices of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act) and Dodd-Frank allegedly places some new limits on those powers—while also enshrining new regulatory responsibilities for the Fed.  On net, what does this all mean for the Federal Reserve’s power and discretion in a post-Dodd-Frank era?  In a new one-pager, Bernard Shull assesses the question and expresses some skepticism about the idea that the Fed will be meaningfully constrained by the new rules.

For instance, about Dodd-Frank’s restrictions on the Fed’s ability to provide credit extensions to nonbanks Shull writes:

… it does not permit the Fed to target specific companies, as it did with AIG in the recent crisis. It does permit the extension of credit within a “broad-based” program, albeit with Treasury approval. However, this is a weak constraint. The Fed could circumvent this limitation by organizing private consortiums, as it did for Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. “Circumvention” may be the wrong word, as the executive branch has been at least as determined as the Fed to extend credit to nonbanks in the face of a systemic threat.

Read the one-pager here.  For a longer treatment, see Shull’s working paper.

In the latest phase of our endless budget brinksmanship, congressional Republicans will attempt to extract policy concessions in return for raising the debt limit (Republicans are not only demanding cuts to Social Security and Medicare—they are brazenly demanding that Democrats propose, and therefore own, these unpopular cuts).  The administration and key allies are claiming they will not negotiate over the debt limit.

At stake in this standoff is not just whether the federal government will default on its financial commitments (which is to say, whether Congress will absurdly prevent the government from paying the bills that Congress has legally obligated it to rack up) but also whether we will move one step further toward making these standoffs a customary part of the (mal)functioning of government.

In the context of some key changes made by the Dodd-Frank Act, this new normal on the debt ceiling has disquieting implications for how the federal government will respond when the next financial crisis hits.  Dodd-Frank doesn’t do much to prevent the next crisis from emerging, but it does change the way the government can respond.  At last year’s Minsky conference in New York (see Session 6), Morgan Ricks noted that a number of organizations that played a large role in the response to the financial meltdown (Fed, Treasury, FDIC) have seen their discretionary authority limited by Dodd-Frank.  Most notably, the Federal Reserve’s leeway under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act has been curbed (13[3] allowed the Fed to lend, “under unusual and exigent circumstances,” to individuals, partnerships, and corporations at its own discretion; it was under this authority that most of the unconventional lending and asset purchases were carried out).

After Dodd-Frank, Ricks observed, we are now supposed to rely on the FDIC’s newly-created “Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA) to handle the collapse of a large multifunction financial institution.  The use of the OLA requires the approval of the Treasury Secretary and two-thirds of the both the Federal Reserve board and the FDIC board, but most importantly, funding for the OLA will come from the Treasury rather than the Federal Reserve.  Ricks pointed out that since the Treasury would have to issue debt to provide such funding (assuming platinum coins are off the table), this means that a future government rescue through the OLA may require that Congress lift the debt ceiling in the midst of a financial emergency.  You might say this adds a laudable element of accountability and transparency to any future crisis response.  But after watching Congress perform these past two years, how confident are you that this will end well?

Many of the themes in fiscal policy, economic growth, and distribution that we have been working on here have been in the news lately. Scholars from many fields are weighing in. One common theme is dynamics and their importance:

1)      Evidence of a self-reinforcing fiscal trap in operation in Britain, forwarded by the NIESR, a British think tank:  Dawn Holland and Jonathan Portes argue today in Vox that in the UK austerity has led to higher debt-to-GDP ratios, defying the predictions of orthodox macro models. For something from our Institute on the topic of fiscal traps, including the UK example, you might take a look at this public policy brief from Dimitri Papadimtriou and me, posted just last week.

It is important to keep in mind, as the authors of the British study point out, that fiscal austerity is hardly the only cause of the economic crises now underway in much of the world. For example, they get at the problem of coordinating macro policies in a group of open economies. Above this paragraph is a diagram from our brief, illustrating, among other things, the role of Minskyan financial fragility in generating crises in many places in the world. This role is shown by the light green arrows in the diagram, which show how rising numbers of “Ponzi units,” (firms and households that need to borrow in order to make their interest payments) can play a role in a fiscal trap. Spending cuts or tax increases are sometimes “self-defeating” in this view because they undermine the tax base—the amount of activity subject to taxation. The mechanism involved is a Keynesian multiplier effect. Internationally, there are many examples of this problem these days.

2)      More on models of economic growth and income distribution and their relationship to models from applied mathematics in letters to the editor of the Financial Times (here and here) and in a blog post from a mathematician: The FT letters discuss, among other things, the perhaps debatable role of unemployment in keeping real wages from rising. On the other hand, the blog post discusses various kinds of discontinuous dynamic behavior that fall under the rubric of catastrophe theory, mentioning a classic business-cycle model by Nicholas Kaldor and various sorts of straws that break camels’ backs. Author Steven Strogatz notes that “in some…cases (boiling water, optical patterns), the picture from catastrophe theory agrees rigorously with observation. But when applied to economics, sleep, ecology, or sociology, its more like the camel story—a stylized scenario that shouldn’t be taken for more than it is: a speculation, a hint of something deeper, a glimpse into the darkness.”

All of these ideas play a role in numerous macroeconomic models, including the one that I discussed in this post, which features CDF interactive graphics. New macro team hire Michalis Nikiforos has been working on many of these issues, too.

Levy Institute scholars James Galbraith and Randall Wray presented at the annual conference held by the Central Bank of Argentina last week. Galbraith’s presentation began with the issue of the flexibility of central bank mandates and then turned to an account of the long-term evolution in the economy that prepared the groundwork for the recent global financial crisis. Randall Wray spoke on the theoretical and policy implications of a government’s ability to issue a sovereign currency.  Video and slides below the fold (full list of speakers here). continue reading…

I returned to the Levy Institute yesterday after the International Post Keynesian Conference in beautiful Kansas City. I will mention some of the news from the conference, for readers who are interested in the kinds of events that Levy Institute scholars attend.

At such conferences, ideas are taken very seriously, and many interesting debates were simmering at this one.  Theories and models abounded. Many of them went right to the heart of the causes of the financial crisis.

Speaking of interesting, students were among those attending and helped to organize the conference. Some were selling official conference t-shirts as well as used books in the vendors’ area. I haven’t had a chance to try my shirt on, having returned home only Sunday night on a delayed flight.

Many of the giants in the field were there.  A surprise event in honor of the Institute’s Jan Kregel took place last Thursday night, the first night of the conference.  Kregel recently joined Paul Davidson as an editor of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. A new Post Keynesian economic policy forum is online, and many from the Institute are editors. This new paperback from Eckhard Hein and Englebert Stockhammer, also on display at the conference, explains some of the ideas and history of this school of economists, including their conferences. Post Keynesian and Keynesian economics have of course been resurgent in recent years, and the topic of Hyman Minsky (whose archive is here) in particular frequently came up in the presentations and discussions among the economists.

An enjoyable keynote speech by noted author Robert Skidelsky came after the conference was officially adjourned. Skidelsky argued in favor of an “underconsumptionist” interpretation of the current world economic situation. In other words, a tilt in income distribution reduces spending by the masses. He noted that Keynes himself deployed such an argument in his later work, though his 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money emphasized that volatile investment, driven by changing expectations, largely accounted for fluctuations in total output and employment.  The speech also mentioned the views of Depression-era Fed Chair Marriner Eccles, which were featured in this recent post by Thorvald Grung Moe, another conference participant.  Skidelsky also discussed his new book, How Much Is Enough? (Amazon link), which is coauthored by Edward Skidelsky.

As for myself, I presented my most recent Levy Institute working paper and two example computable documents based on the model. The documents, which allow one to experiment with the model, along with links to the paper, appear in this May post.*  A somewhat skeptical Marc Lavoie, Fred Lee, and Sunanda Sen asked questions during the Q and A. After the session, Davidson was kind enough to bring up a few important issues that did not figure in my paper and presentation, including the key role of household credit, which has, however, been an important part of some previous work by me and other macroeconomists at the Institute (like this 2007 brief on the potential for a mortgage crisis, which I coauthored with Dimitri Papadimitriou and Gennaro Zezza).

*Note: The post is now slightly revised.- G.H., October 3.

For those who haven’t seen it already, US News and World Report did a brief piece a short while ago on Minsky’s approach to financial instability.  After running through a list of recent financial panics and crises, Chris Gay notes that from a certain theoretical perspective, this wasn’t supposed to happen.  “This sort of blood-curdling free-fall is supposed to be a once-in-a-lifetime event, like the transit of Venus or a federal budget surplus.  How is it,” he asks, “that someone who was in high school when Justin Bieber was in Pampers has already experienced half a dozen of them? Either we need to redefine ‘crash’ or someone owes you some lifetimes.”  Black swans were once thought by European ornithologists to be rare, until they discovered a number of the birds in Australia.  By contrast, the assumption that financial panics and crises are rare has stuck around, despite more than enough experience with the economic equivalent of black feathers.

In Minsky’s view, financial crises are a normal part of the functioning of this economic system; they are not some deus ex machina that arrives from without to push the system off-balance.  Digesting this way of looking at the stability of our economic system won’t just affect whether we’re surprised when the next panic or crisis comes crashing down on our heads, but also, as Jan Kregel and Dimitri Papadimitriou explain, how we approach financial regulation:

As Minsky emphasized, you cannot adequately design regulations that increase the stability of financial markets if you do not have a theory of financial instability. If the “normal” precludes instability, except as a random ad hoc event, regulation will always be dealing with ad hoc events that are unlikely to occur again. As a result, the regulations will be powerless to prevent future instability. What is required is a theory in which financial instability is a normal occurrence in the system.

For more, the Levy Institute ebook Beyond the Minsky Moment lays out the implications of Minsky’s approach for how we should understand the roots of the recent meltdown and why we can neither settle for Dodd-Frank nor go back to Glass-Steagall. (epub, pdf)

Whatever the outcome of efforts to resolve severe economic difficulties in Europe and elsewhere, it is becoming increasingly clear that the next big economic crisis may not hinge on interest rates at all. One reason is that the world’s central banks, many of them following something like a Robinsonian “cheap money policy,” have managed to keep interest rates reasonably low in many countries. For example, it seems clear that yields on Spanish and Italian bonds are under control for now, after statements last month by Mario Draghi, the president of the ECB, that he was “ready to do whatever it takes,” to keep interest rates down. As made clear in this interesting and enlightening 2003 book edited by Bell and Nell (Stephanie Bell Kelton and Edward Nell), the theoretical argument for the Eurozone was badly flawed from the beginning.  (Indeed, many in the world of heterodox economics saw these  flaws from the beginning.) But, returning in this post to a key theme in Joan Robinson’s writings on the interest rate, I will offer some of the thoughts of John Maynard Keynes himself, who wrote in 1945 that:

The monetary authorities can have any rate of interest they like.… They can make both the short and long-term [rate] whatever they like, or rather whatever they feel to be right. … Historically the authorities have always determined the rate at their own sweet will and have been influenced almost entirely by balance of trade reasons [Collected Writings*, xxvii, 390–92, quoted from L.–P. Rochon, Credit, Money and Production, page 163 (publisher book link)].

Here in the United States, the Fed has shown its ability as a liquidity provider to keep interest rates on relatively safe investments very low across the maturity spectrum, despite spending much more than it received in tax payments in calendar years 2009–2011, and presumably the current year.  Keynes’s statement, much like the quote from Robinson mentioned above and the one in this earlier post, foretells this outcome.

Hence, recent US experience supports the view that calls for cuts in government spending and/or tax increases cannot be justified by fears that high deficits cause high interest rates at the national or global level.

* Note: The complete set of Keynes’s  works is out of print in hardback and will be reissued as a 30-volume set of paperbacks later this fall, according the Cambridge University Press website. – G.H., September 3

Local government officials in San Bernardino county have apparently heard enough about how the overhang of mortgage debt is holding back the recovery, and they’re considering taking matters into their own hands.  Reuters‘ Matthew Goldstein and Jennifer Ablan report on the background discussions leading up to a proposal that is being considered by officials in San Bernardino, California—a county where almost half of all mortgages are “underwater.”  The general idea is to use eminent domain as a kind of mortgage debt forgiveness program:  principal reduction would be achieved by forcing the sale of mortgages that have been packaged into securities; the mortgages would then be restructured on more favorable terms.  Homeowners with underwater mortgages who are current on their payments would be able to participate.

Randall Wray and Paul McCulley are quoted in the piece, with the latter describing the program as “[a] legal system-midwifed, modern-day jubilee.”  Read the article here.

Alan Greenspan is apparently writing a book to determine why economic models (all of them, he says) failed to sniff out the financial crisis and ensuing recession. “While the models themselves capture the nonfinancial part of the economy rather well,” says Greenspan, “they’ve been wholly inadequate in understanding how the complex financial system works, both in the United States and globally.”

As it happens, the Levy Institute’s Hyman P. Minsky Summer Seminar just finished up, and last week Gennaro Zezza presented on the stock-flow consistent model used here at the Institute.  The approach embedded in this model, originally inspired by Wynne Godley and still being refined and expanded, is notable for the manner in which it looks at the relationship between finance and the real economy.  For an explanation of its contours and to see how it differs from some of the more orthodox models Greenspan presumably has in mind, this paper by Zezza (“Fiscal Policy and the Economics of Financial Balances”) is a good place to start.  As the paper illustrates, the model has had a pretty good track record.

Godley and Marc Lavoie’s “Monetary Economics” (recently discussed by Lavoie in a two–part interview with Philip Pilkington) describes some of the early challenges with obtaining good data on the financial flows that are part of this approach (pp. 24-25).  But as Godley and Lavoie wrote, “[t]he problem now is not so much the lack of appropriate data … but rather the unwillingness of most mainstream macroeconomists to incorporate these financial flows and capital stocks into their models, obsessed as they are with the representative optimizing microeconomic agent.”

Whether or not you already know what a “repo” is, Public Citizen’s new report on repurchase agreements, which played a part in the recent financial crisis (as well as the collapse of MF Global), is well worth reading.  Here’s their introduction:

In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, banks depended increasingly on an unreliable method of funding their activities, called “repurchase agreements,” or repos. Repos may look like relatively safe borrowing agreements, but they can quickly create widespread instability in the financial system. The dangers of repos stem from a legal fiction: despite being the functional equivalent of secured loans, repo agreements are legally defined as sales. Dressing up repo loans as sales can lead to sloppy lending practices, followed by sudden decisions by lenders to end their risky lending agreements and market panics. Repos also permit financial institutions to cover up shortcomings on their balance sheets. The problems in the repo market were exposed as the 2008 financial crisis unfolded, yet the risks posed by repos remain largely unaddressed. Without reform, the financial system will remain susceptible to the sudden and severe shocks that repos can cause.

Micah Hauptman and Taylor Lincoln have also written a blog post that runs down some of the basics.

In their report, Public Citizen uses data from the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) that displays how heavily repos are (still) being used among the top six bank holding companies. This figure shows the percentage of the liabilities held by the biggest banks that are deemed “less stable” by FSOC.  As you can see, repos (in green) represent the largest chunk:

Source: Financial Stability Oversight Council Annual Report (2011)

The Public Citizen report also includes a brief history of the regulatory changes that enabled repos to play a role in the financial crisis. continue reading…