“You cannot solve the problem with this level of financing.  It’s not possible.”

Dimitri Papadimitriou, interviewed yesterday for Ian Masters’ “Background Briefing,” gets to the heart of the matter on the shortcomings of the proposals for resolving the eurozone crisis that are currently on the table.  Papadimitriou argues that we’re likely looking at a default from the Greek state and that estimates of bondholders facing a 50-60 percent haircut are actually quite optimistic.  He also discusses the possibilities of the “contagion” spreading to this side of the pond.  Listen to the full interview here.

Are you a reclusive economist-savant who happens to know how a member state might be able to exit the European Monetary Union in an orderly fashion?  Would your idea appeal to a center-right British think tank?  If so, you need to shave your beard and put in for the Wolfson Prize (don’t worry, with the 250,000 pounds sterling you can buy a new beard).  Via Free Exchange, the winning proposal will be chosen by a panel of economists selected by Policy Exchange, a London-based think tank.  Lord Wolfson of Aspley Guise, who is putting up the cash, explains what they’re looking for:  “Consideration will need to be given to what a post-euro Eurozone would look like, how transition could be achieved and how the interests of employment, savers, and debtors would be balanced. Importantly, careful consideration must also be given to managing the potential impact on the international banking system.”

Some of the Levy Institute’s work on the eurozone crisis more generally can be found here:

• Papadimitriou and Wray, “Euroland in Crisis as the Global Meltdown Picks Up Speed”

• Polychroniou, “An Unblinking Glance at a National Catastrophe and the Potential Dissolution of the Eurozone”

• Varoufakis and Holland, “A Modest Proposal for Overcoming the Euro Crisis”

• Auerback, “What Happens if Germany Exits the Euro?”

• Papadimitriou, Wray, and Nersisyan, “Endgame for the Euro?”

In his latest one-pager (“Dawn of a New Day for Europe?“) C. J. Polychroniou anticipates the outlines of a Merkel-Sarkozy agreement on policies designed to address the eurozone debt crisis, and comes away skeptical.  Polychroniou suggests that a massive infusion of emergency funding, somewhere on the order of 2 to 3 trillion euros, would be required, but that the self-imposed necessity of operating within the constraints of the ECB’s 2 percent inflation ceiling, as well as the political challenge of passing any far-reaching measures through the national parliaments, make a sufficient response unlikely.  Read it here.

Rob Parenteau has a post at Naked Capitalism commenting on Wolfgang Münchau’s article in the Financial Times.  Münchau argues that policy makers in Europe largely ignored the spillover effects of simultaneous fiscal contraction across the entire eurozone.  Parenteau insists that, at least at the level of ideas, the problem occurs at a much more basic level:

…while this pursuit of simultaneous, multi-year fiscal consolidation can only thwart itself by dragging down growth and dampening tax revenues, thereby leading perversely to still higher public debt outstanding, the problem does not lie so much in failure of policy makers to recognize and take into account the interactive effects of fiscal consolidation across countries. Rather, the truth of the matter is that most of the eurozone policy makers and their erstwhile economic advisors are practicing a faith based economics. They believe in the moral purity of balanced fiscal budgets. They also believe private sector activity will pick up to more than compensate for public sector cutbacks. That is the essence of the Ricardian Equivalence Theory, which is a central theoretical proposition that mainstream economists believe in and teach every graduate student to parrot.

Paul Krugman had a similar reaction:

That said, I think Munchau is being too kind here. European leaders and institutions by and large didn’t even get to the point of devising policies that might have worked in a small open economy. Instead, they went in for fantasy economics, believing that the confidence fairy would make fiscal contraction expansionary.

Parenteau points to presentations he delivered at the Levy Institute’s Minsky Conference in which he assailed this idea of “expansionary contraction” (the idea that deficit-cutting can boost growth) from the standpoint of the financial balances approach.  In his 2010 presentation, Parenteau regrets that the sectoral balances approach, typified by the work of Wynne Godley, hasn’t caught on more in the mainstream—though in journalism he notes the occasional exception from Martin Wolf in the Financial Times (see Wolf’s latest column for just such a flirtation with the financial balance approach.  The heterodox flavor of Martin Wolf’s writing is quite striking, as noted previously.)

You can hear the audio for Parentau’s 2010 presentation here (see Thursday, Session 4); the slides for the presentation are here.

“Crises are an inherent feature of capitalism. Marx knew this only too well; so did Keynes and Minsky. Neoliberals, on the other hand, tend to believe that it is government action that causes market turbulence and economic instability.”  This is the opening salvo from a new one-pager by C. J. Polychroniou that takes on neoliberal doctrine in light of the global financial crisis (Read it here.)

Polychroniou also has a recent working paper that looks at the potential dissolution of the Eurozone as a failure of neoliberalism:

…the fact that EU’s leaders are having a difficult time getting a handle on the Greek problem and providing a comprehensive solution for the eurozone debt crisis is due to the very constraints of the neoliberal economic regime in which policymakers operate, and helped to create, and much less a question of political incompetence. The architecture of eurozone governance, combined with the asymmetries of European integration, severely limit quick, far-reaching political decisions for addressing the debt crisis, including Europe’s banking system that remains vastly undercapitalized.

The paper includes a detailed and compelling narrative of how Greece got to where it is today.  (Read the working paper here.)

(cross posted from EconoMonitor)

Yet another rescue plan for the EMU is making its way through central Europe—raising the total funding available to the equivalent of $600 billion. Germany agreed to raise its contribution to the fund by more than $100 billion equivalent. However, Slovakia has vetoed the rescue and all eyes are now turned to a forthcoming October 23 summit.

In any event, some rescue package is assured because the center of Europe wants to save its banks—that hold billions of euros of troubled government debt.
No one is foolish enough to believe that will be enough. The latest casualty is Dexia Group, a Belgian-French behemoth that specializes in sovereign debt. It had already been bailed out once, and now needs another bail-out. Rest assured that Dexia is just today’s domino—the other big European banks will fail, too. This is not a Greek problem. It is not an Irish problem. It is not a Portuguese problem. It is not a Spanish problem. It is not an Italian problem.

It is an EMU problem and Band-Aids will never suffice.

The problem with the set-up of the EMU was the separation of nations from their currencies—as I have long argued, along with Charles Goodhart, Warren Mosler, and Wynne Godley. (Go here for a relatively recent piece.) And as I said a few weeks ago, it was a system designed to fail. With no central government that issues currency it has no way to use fiscal policy on a large enough scale to counter the business cycle, let alone to deal with a financial crisis on the scale we’ve seen since 2007.

And with the gathering storm, the individual members of the EMU will be swamped as their financial institutions are forced to realize losses.

Even if the member states were not busy pointing fingers and squabbling over profligate spending by neighbors, the current arrangements prohibit any effective response to crisis. When markets decide to attack one member, it quickly finds itself in a vicious debt trap, with interest rates rising that blow a hole in the budget. At most, other members can put together a debt package—lending at slightly more generous terms.

But what highly indebted members need is debt relief and economic growth, not more debt. With austerity demanded in order to get the proffered loans, growth turns negative, increasing budget deficits and leading to more desperate borrowing.

So either way, the indebted country gets into the debt trap: if it borrows from markets, interest rates rise; if it borrows from the EMU (or the IMF) its growth falls and tax revenue plummets.

Damned if you do, damned if you don’t. continue reading…

Michael Hudson on the ECB and eurozone national central banks’ restricted abilities to purchase government debt:

Their banks have perpetuated the “road to serfdom” myth that a central bank runs the danger of fueling inflation if it creates money – in contrast to commercial banks, which supposedly run no such danger if they create money on their own computer keyboards. It is not considered inflationary for them to charge interest to the government, which then needs to pay by taxing the economy at large.

When you find this kind of distortion being popularized and even written into law, there always is a special interest at work. The supposed contrast between “bad” central banks and “good” commercial banks is a lobbying effort seeking to monopolize credit creation in the hands of commercial banks, by promoting a travesty of how central banks are supposed to act.

The reality is that commercial banks have fueled an enormous asset-price inflation in recent years. The debt they have created imposes an interest burden that deflates the economy – even while adding to the cost of living and doing business. Meanwhile, central banks monetize government deficits that are supposed to spur recovery, not simply be giveaways to financial institutions and other vested interests. …

Whether a bank is private or public, money and credit are created electronically on computer keyboards. So it is a myth that government money is more inflationary. But this myth has a political function reflecting private self-interest: it blocks the “public option” of creating money without paying interest to banks which have obtained the privilege of creating credit freely. They are not lending out peoples’ savings deposits, but are creating deposits much like they used to print bank notes. They then look for customers willing to pay interest.

Hudson, a Research Associate here at the Institute, was interviewed for the “Guns and Butter” radio program on the topic of debt deflation in the eurozone and the US.  (Transcript posted over at Naked Capitalism).

(Cross posted from EconoMonitor)

Greece’s Finance Minister reportedly said that his nation cannot continue to service its debt and hinted that a fifty percent write-down is likely. Greece’s sovereign debt is 350 billion euros—so losses to holders would be 175 billion euros. That would just be the beginning, however.

Nouriel Roubini has argued that the crisis will spread from Greece and increase the possibility that both Italy and Spain could be forced out unless European leaders greatly increase the funds available for bail-outs. The Sunday Telegraph has suggested that as much as 1.75 trillion sterling could be required. To put that in perspective, the US bailout of its financial system after 2008 came to $29 trillion. The 1.75 trillion figure will almost certainly prove to be wishful thinking if sovereign debt goes bad, because that will make the US subprime crisis look like a nursery school dispute. All the major European banks will go down—and so will the $3 trillion US money market mutual funds. (That probably explains why the US has suddenly taken a keen interest in Euroland, with the Fed ramping up lending to what Americans had formerly seen as “Eurotrash” financial institutions.)

It is becoming increasingly clear that authorities are merely trying to buy time to figure out how they can save the core French and German banks against a cascade of likely sovereign defaults. Meanwhile, they keep a stiff upper lip and demand more blood in the form of periphery austerity. They know this will do no good at all–indeed, it will increase the eventual costs of the bail-out while stoking North-South hostility. Presumably leaders like Chancellor Merkel are throwing red meat to their base for purely domestic political reasons.  If the EMU is eventually saved, however, the rancor will make it very difficult to mend fences.

There is no alternative to debt relief for Greek and other periphery nations.  But, they are not likely to get it, at least on the scale needed. Certainly not before a lot more pain is inflicted, and a lot more grovelling shown to Europe’s masters.

Indeed, the picture of the debtors that the Germans, especially, want to paint is one of profligate consumption fueled by runaway government spending by Mediterraneans. The only solution is to tighten the screws. As Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble put it: “The main reason for the lack of demand is the lack of confidence; the main reason for the lack of confidence is the deficits and public debts which are seen as unsustainable…We won’t come to grips with economies deleveraging by having governments and central banks throwing – literally – even more money at the problem. You simply cannot fight fire with fire.” You’ve got to fight the headwinds with more glacial ice.

While the story of fiscal excess is a stretch even in the case of the Greeks, it certainly cannot apply to Ireland and Iceland—or even to Spain. continue reading…

Dimitri Papadimitriou was interviewed for Ian Masters’ “Background Briefing” segment regarding Greece’s place in the eurozone debt crisis, the inevitability of default (“… it’s going to happen much sooner than we think”), and other issues.  Listen here.

Dimitri Papadimitriou writes in the Huffington Post about two different “endgame” scenarios for the euro:

The collapse of the euro project will break in one of two ways. Most likely, and least desirable, is that nations will leave the euro in a coordinated dissolution which might ideally resemble an amicable divorce. As with most divorces, it would leave all the participants financially worse off. Wealthier countries would be back to the kinds of tariffs, transaction costs, and immobile labor and capital that inspired the euro in the first place; poorer nations could kiss their subsidies, explicit and implicit, good-bye.

Less likely, but more desirable, would be a major economic restructuring leading towards increased European consolidation. The EFSF — the European Financial Stability Facility, which is the rescue fund of the European Central Bank — has access to €440 billion. Thus far, the real beneficiaries of the EU bailouts have been the banks that hold all the debt (you haven’t seen this movie before, have you?).

But with some restructuring and alteration of regulations, that wouldn’t need to be the case. The doomed rescue plans we’re seeing don’t address the central problem: Countries with very different economies are yoked to the same currency. Nations like Greece aren’t positioned to compete with countries that are more productive, like Germany, or have lower production costs, like Latvia. Any workable plan to save the euro has to address those differences.

Papadimitriou goes on to outline what an ideal restructuring might look like.

Previous posts on this issue can be found here, here, and here.